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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following situation: a driller is operating the
drawworks' on an offshore oil rig deep in the waters of the Gulf of
Mexico. He has a massive heart attack and loses control of the
drawworks. The weight attached to the drawworks' cable plunges
downward and lands on several roustabouts 2 who are connecting
pipe. The roustabouts are instantly killed and several rig workers
are seriously injured. The driller is incapacitated. The offshore
drilling company exercises immediate emergency procedures and
arranges for a Mexican helicopter to medivac the injured employee
to the nearest Mexican hospital. But thunderstorms delay the
rescue process. The injured workers do not arrive at the hospital
until forty-eight hours after the accident. Many
of the injured
3
workers cannot be saved because of the delay.
Marc Klein, my former colleague, and I outlined the doomsday
scenario mentioned above in a request for technical assistance
letter sent to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in March 2004 on behalf of our client-an offshore
1. The "drawworks" is the machine on an oil rig consisting of a large
diameter steel spool, brakes, a power source, and assorted auxiliary devices.
The primary function of the drawworks is to reel out and reel in the drilling line,
a large diameter wire rope, in a controlled fashion. The drilling line is reeled
over the crown block and traveling block to gain mechanical advantage in a
"block and tackle" or "pulley" fashion. This reeling out and reeling in of the
drilling line causes the traveling block, and whatever may be hanging
underneath it, to be lowered into or raised out of the wellbore. The reeling out
of the drilling line is powered by gravity and reeling in by an electric motor or
diesel engine. Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary, available at http://www.
glossary.oilfield.slb.com.
2. A "roustabout" is an unskilled manual laborer on the rig site. A
roustabout may be part of the drilling contract workforce or may be on location
temporarily for special operations. Roustabouts are commonly hired to ensure
that the skilled personnel that run an expensive drilling rig are not distracted by
peripheral tasks, ranging from cleaning up the location to cleaning threads to
digging trenches to scraping and painting rig components. Although roustabouts
typically work long hard days, this type of employment can lead to more steady
employment on a rig crew. Schiumberger Oilfield Glossary, available at
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com.
3. Letter from Marc Klein, Thompson & Knight L.L.P, Request for
Technical Assistance under the ADA, to Joyce Walker-Jones, Senior Attorney
Advisor, ADA Policy Division, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(March 18, 2004) (on file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the author).
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drilling company. 4 The company had experienced several close
calls in which offshore employees had 5experienced life-threatening
medical emergencies while on the rig. These emergencies placed
the lives of the affected individuals in grave danger.6 While the
aforementioned nightmare scenario was hypothetical, it was
grounded in reality. This situation, or some variation thereof,
could happen in the future. To reduce the risks of the occurrence
of such a catastrophic incident and to protect the health and safety
of its offshore employees, the company desired to adopt a policy
requiring all 7offshore employees to undergo periodic medical
examinations.
The request for technical assistance letter contended that the
company's proposed policy complied with the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in that the policy was both jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. The EEOC, citing
its own EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related
Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, disagreed. 9
This article explains why across-the-board mandatory periodic
medical examinations for employees working at dangerous jobs in
remote locations, such as offshore drilling workers, do not violate
the ADA-the EEOC's unofficial position notwithstanding. Part
II of this article discusses the ADA provisions regarding medical
examinations during various stages of the employment process. It
also addresses the EEOC's interpretation of the statutory language
concerning medical examinations of existing employees.

4. Id. at 1.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. The proposed periodic medical examinations included tests in the
following areas: hearing, heart (including EKG), and blood pressure. Id.

8. Id. at 6.
9. Letter from Joyce Walker-Jones, Senior Attorney Advisor, ADA Policy
Division, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to Marc Klein,
Thompson & Knight LLP, (September 10, 2004) (on file with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the author) ("We believe that the
situation you have described does not fit within existing Commission policy as
set out in Questions 8 and 18 of the [EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
Interpreting the ADA to allow periodic medical examinations in the manner you
suggest would require the Commission to make new policy."). See also
Employer Cannot Require Offshore Workers to Have PeriodicMedical Exams,
EEOC Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 228, at A-3 (Nov. 29, 2004) (an
informal guidance letter is not an official EEOC opinion).

684

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Part III of the article advocates a better approach than the one
taken by the EEOC. Instead of limiting the employer's ability to
require medical examinations of employees to (i) instances in
which an employer has specific evidence that an individual has a
medical condition that prohibits him or her from safely performing
the job or (ii) only those individuals who work in public safety
positions, the "business necessity" defense in 42 U.S.C. §
12112(d)(4)(A) should allow employers to require periodic
medical examinations of all employees that work at dangerous jobs
in remote locations. The approach I advocate is consistent with the
language of the statute and addresses the legitimate safety concerns
of employers who require employees to perform dangerous jobs in
remote locations.
Part IV is a preemptive response to those in the labor and
employment law community who may believe this proposed
approach imprudently permits an employer to engage in
"workplace paternalism." In my view, workplace paternalism in
this particular situation is no vice and does not constitute disability
discrimination. I will explain why I believe the underlying
rationale for my approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,'0 reflects a sound
policy choice that is permitted by the statute, and is economically
efficient.
I. THE EEOC'S INTERPRETATION
A. MedicalExaminationsunderthe ADA
On July 26, 1990, President George Herbert Walker Bush, the
forty-first President of the United States of America, signed the
ADA into law.ll Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from
discriminating against a job applicant or employee because of his
or her disability. 12
The prohibition against disability

10. 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
11. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (1995). President Bush's statement upon signing the ADA into law can
be found in the permanent edition of the UnitedStates Code Congressionaland
Administrative News. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S.
933, 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) provides:
General rule.--No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
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discrimination includes medical examinations and inquiries.' 3 But
this prohibition is not absolute. The relevant statutory provision,
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d), provides the employer with varying levels
of discretion to require medical examinations, depending on the
stage of the employment process. 14 Section 12112(d) provides as
follows:
(d) Medical Examinations and Inquiries
(1) In general.-The prohibition against discrimination as
referred to in subsection (a) shall include medical
examinations and inquiries.
(2) Preemployment.(A) Prohibited examination or inquiry.-Except as provided
in paragraph (3), a covered entity shall not conduct a
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as
to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability
or as to the nature or severity of such disability.
(B) Acceptable inquiry.-A covered entity may make
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to
perform job-related functions.
(3) Employment Entrance Examinations.-A covered
entity may require a medical examination after an offer of

discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (emphasis added).
"The term 'covered entity' means an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint-labor management committee." Id. § 12111(2). In
general, an "employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person . . . ." Id. § 12111(5)(A). A "qualified individual with a disability" is
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8).
13. Id. § 12112(d)(1) states:
"In general.-The prohibition against
discrimination as referred to in [§ 12112(a)] shall include medical examinations
and inquiries."
14. See Harris v. Harris & Hart, Inc., 206 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that "[w]ith regard to an employer's request for medical examinations
and inquiries, the ADA sets up separate rules for pre-offer job applications [§
12112(d)(2)], post-offer pre-employment examinations [§ 12112(d)(3)], and
inquiries of current employees [§ 12112(d)(4)].").
See also Grenier v.
Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 671 (1st Cir. 1995); Pouliot v. Town of
Fairfield, 226 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 (D. Maine 2002); Gary Phelan & Janet Bond
Arterton, Disability Discrimination in the Workplace § 6:1 (2003).
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employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to
the commencement of the employment duties of such
applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on
the results of such examination, if:
(A)all entering employees are subject to an examination
regardless of disability;
(B) information obtained regarding the medical condition or
history of the applicant is collected and maintained on
separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated
as a confidential medical record, except that:
(i) supervisors and managers may be informed regarding
necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the
employee and necessary accommodations;
(ii) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when
appropriate, if the disability might require emergency
treatment; and
(iii)government officials investigating compliance with this
chapter shall be provided relevant information on request;
and
(C) the results of such examination are used only in
accordance with this subchapter.
(4) Examination and Inquiry;(A) Prohibited examinations and inquiries.-A covered
entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such
employee is an individual with a disability or as to the
nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination
or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity.
(B) Acceptable examinations and inquiries.-A covered
entity may conduct voluntary medical examinations,
including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an
employee health program available to employees at that
work site. A covered entity may make inquiries into the
ability of an employee to perform job-related functions.
(C) Requirement.-Information
obtained
under
subparagraph (B) regarding the medical condition or
history of any employee are subject to the requirements of
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (3).15
Section 12112(d) creates three categories of medical
examinations and inquiries by employers: (1) preemployment
examinations and inquiries in § 12112(d)(2); (2) employment
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
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entrance examinations in § 12112(d)(3); and (3) employee
examinations and inquiries in § 12112(d)(4). 16 Preemployment
examinations and inquiries are those conducted prior to an offer of
employment.
Employment entrance examinations are those
conducted after an offer of employment has been made but before
the start of job duties.
Employee examinations are those
conducted of current employees.'
For clarity and ease of
understanding, I will refer, as many commentators do, to these
three stages throughout the remainder of this article as pre-offer,
post-offer, and post-employment. 18 The following lays out the
three stages, the varying levels of prohibition established by (d)(2),
(d)(3), and (d)(4), and the interpretations of the courts and the
EEOC.
1. Pre-OfferMedical Examinations-CompleteProhibition
Section 12112(d)(2) completely prohibits employers from
requiring job applicants to submit to medical examinations' 9 before
16. See Norman-Bloodshaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d
1260, 1273 (9th Cir. 1998).
17. Id.
18. See Phelan & Arterton, supranote 14, at § 6:1.
19. The ADA does not define the term "medical examination." The EEOC
defines "medical examination" as "a procedure or test usually given by a health
care professional or in a medical setting that seeks information about an
individual's physical or mental impairments or health." See EEOC, Questions
and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and
Medical Examinations of Employees under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
(ADA) (July 26, 2000), at Question 2, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/guidance-inquiries.html [hereinafter EEOC, Questions and Answers]. The
EEOC states that seven factors should be considered in determining whether a
test or procedure is a medical examination. They are: (1) whether the test is
administered by a health care professional; (2) whether the test is interpreted by
a health care professional; (3) whether the test is designed to reveal an
impairment or physical or mental health; (4) whether the test is invasive; (5)
whether the test measures an employee's performance of a task or measures his
or her physiological responses to performing the task; (6) whether the test is
normally given in a medical setting; and (7) whether medical equipment is used.
One factor alone could be sufficient to classify a procedure as a medical exam,
but in most cases a combination of the factors will decide the question. Id.
According to the EEOC, blood pressure screening, blood and urine tests, vision
tests, cholesterol tests, x-rays, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) are all
"medical exams," while physical agility tests and psychological tests that
measure personality traits are not. Id.
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the employer makes the applicant an offer of employment. 20 The
plain language of the provision does not provide any exceptions to
this rule. However, the statute itself creates an exception to the
general rule barring pre-offer medical inquiries. An employer
may make pre-offer medical inquiries when those inquiries relate
22
to the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.
Two other exceptions to the general rule barring pre-offer medical
inquiries also have been recognized by the EEOC and the courts:
(i) when an employer could reasonably believe that an applicant's
known disability will interfere with the performance of a jobrelated function23 and (ii) when an applicant requests a reasonable
24
accommodation for the application process or for the job itself.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) ("A covered entity shall not conduct a
medical examination .... "); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (111) (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 466 [hereinafter House Judiciary Report] (employers
may not conduct a medical examination of an applicant prior to an offer of
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II) (1990), reprinted in 1990
employment);
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355 [hereinafter House Labor Report] ("In order to assure
that misconceptions do not bias the employment selection process, this section
sets up a process that begins with the prohibition on pre-employment medical
examinations or inquiries.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
22. Id. ("A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions."). See Harris v. Harris
& Hart, 206 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the statutory exception). The
EEOC has interpreted this exception to require the employer to narrowly tailor
their inquiry to the essential job-related functions. According to its regulation,
an employer "may ask an applicant to describe or to demonstrate how, with or
without reasonable accommodation, the applicant will be able to perform jobrelated functions." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (2005).
23. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.14(a) (2004). The EEOC provided the
following example of a permissible pre-offer medical inquiry: "an employer
may ask an individual with one leg who applies for a position as a home
washing machine repairman to demonstrate or to explain how, with or without
reasonable accommodation, he would be able to transport himself and his tools
down basement stairs." Id.
24. See EEOC, ADA Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment DisabilityRelated Questions and Medical Examinations, (Oct. 1995), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/preemp.html (an employer may request that
the applicant provide documentation from a medical professional concerning his
or her disability when the applicant requests a reasonable accommodation to
complete the application process or perform the job). The courts have applied
this exception in an interesting line of cases involving employees of companies,
known by the companies to have disabilities, who leave the employment of the
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2. Post-Offer Medical Examinations-NoProhibition
After an employer decides that the applicant is the person it
wants to hire for the position, the employer must extend what is
called a conditional job offer to the applicant. 25 The conditional
offer commences the next stage in the process. 2 6 After the
extension of the conditional offer, the employer may require that
the applicant undergo a medical examination or respond to medical
inquiries and may condition the final offer of employment on the
results of those medical tests, so long as all applicants in the same
job category are subjected to such an examination, regardless of
The medical examination results must be kept
disability.
confidential and can only be used in a manner that is consistent
with the ADA. 2 8 In short, the employer may withdraw the

companies and later reapply for a position with the respective company.
Invariably, the company requires the "applicant" to sign a medical release and
provide it with documentation from a physician that the applicant is fit to
perform the essential job functions, with or without a reasonable
accommodation-just as it would if an injured employee were returning to work
after a leave of absence. The "applicant" then sues for violations under 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B), alleging the documentation request is an
impermissible pre-offer medical inquiry. The argument, though clever, has not
won the hearts and minds of the federal judiciary. See Harris,206 F.3d at 845
(company's request for a medical release as a prerequisite to hiring the
applicant, a former employee with a known disability, did not "run afoul of the
ADA"); Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir. 1995)
(ADA does not require an employer to wear blinders to a known disability at the
pre-offer stage; ADA not violated when company required former employee
with a recent known disability applying for re-employment to provide medical
certification as to ability to work with or without reasonable accommodation,
and as to the type of any reasonable accommodation necessary, as long as the
certification is relevant to the assessment of ability to perform essential job
functions); Brumley v. Pena, 62 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1995) (Federal Aviation
Administration did not violate the Rehabilitation Act when it required the
former employee to submit to a psychological examination; although the
Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers from requiring pre-employment physical
examinations, the former employee was not an outside job applicant seeking
employment for the first time, but was instead seeking re-employment).
25. See Phelan & Arterton, supranote 14, at § 6:6.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also David G. Evans, Federal and State Guide to Employee
Medical Leave Benefits & Disabilities Laws § 5:32 (2d. ed. 2002).
28. See Evans, supranote 27, at § 5:32.
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conditional job offer from the applicant if the results from the
medical examination indicate that the applicant is not qualified to
perform the job.
Notably, there is no "job-validation" or "business necessity"
requirement placed on post-offer medical examinations. 29 The
two-step process---complete prohibition of medical examinations
at the pre-offer stage and allowance of medical examinations at the
post-offer stage without regard to whether such examinations are
job-related and consistent with business necessity-follows the
regulations that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) issued in 1977 to implement Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The ADA's drafters chose to incorporate the
Section 504 process into the ADA to balance the concerns of
people with disabilities and employers. The two-step process
benefits the applicant with a disability by allowing him to isolate
whether the employers' decision not to hire him was based on his
disability. 31 Before the ADA, an employer could ask the applicant
at the initial application stage about his medical conditions. The
applicant had to answer the medical questions truthfully. After the
applicant completed the remainder of the application process, the
employer might deny him the job. If the denial occurred, the
applicant would not know whether his disability, or some other
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, led to the employer's
decisions not to hire him. The two-step process takes this
uncertainty out of the disabled applicant's mind."

29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2005)
("Medical examinations conducted in accordance with this section [post-offer
medical examinations] do not have to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity."); House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 73; S. Rep. No.
101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Labor Report];
O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002) (post-offer
medical examinations do not have to be job-related); Norman-Bloodshaw v.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1273 (9th Cir. 1998) (ADA does
not limit the scope of post-offer medical examinations to matters that are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity); Chai Feldblum, Medical
Examinationsand Inquiriesunder the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A View
From the Inside, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 521, 537 (1991) ("After a conditional job
offer has been made, the ADA allows the employer to require all forms of
medical examinations and to make all types of inquiries of job applicants. There
is no 'job-validation' requirement for these examinations or inquiries.").
30. See Feldblum, supra note 29, at 532, 537.
31. Id. at 533.
32. Id. at 531-32.
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The process also benefits applicants with disabilities by
prohibiting the employer from using the results of the medical
examinations as a reason to withdraw the conditional job offer
unless the examination results show that the applicant cannot
perform the essential functions of the job with, or without, a
reasonable accommodation. 33 From the employer's perspective,
the process is helpful because it permits the employer to discover,
prior to the applicant commencing job duties, whether the
medical condition prevents him from performing the
applicant's
34

job.

3. Post-EmploymentMedical Examinations---Somethingin
Between?
Section 12112(d)(4)(A) provides that a current employee shall
not be required to undergo a medical examination "unless such
examination is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity." 35 It is curious that the "business necessity"
language-language typically associated with disparate impact
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-would be
used by the ADA's drafters to limit medical examinations of
current employees. What explains this choice of language and
what does "job-related and consistent with business necessity"
mean in the context of post-employment medical examinations of
33. For example, assume that the post-offer medical examination reveals
that the applicant has an arthritic condition that prevents her from standing on
her feet for eight hours a day. If the job is a sedentary, secretarial position, the
employer could not withdraw the conditional job offer. On the other hand,
assume the applicant has the same condition, but the job is a warehouse position
that requires the employee to be standing for the entire shift. The conditional
job offer could be legitimately revoked in that situation, so long as the standing
requirement is an essential job function and cannot be modified to accommodate
the applicant's disability. Id. at 537-38 (providing an example of an applicant
who applies for a truck driver position and submits to a post-offer medical
examination; if the examination reveals that a person has a disability that does
not affect the applicant's driving ability, the employer cannot withdraw the
conditional job offer without violating the ADA). See also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.14(b)(3) (2005) (stating that if certain criteria are used to screen out an
applicant because of the results of a post-offer medical examination, the
exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and performance of the essential job functions cannot be accomplished with
reasonable accommodation).
34. See Feldblum, supra note 29, at 533.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (1995).
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current employees? A partial answer to this question can be found
through an understanding of the legislative history surrounding this
part of the Act and a recollection of the political fervor
surrounding disparate impact law circa 1989.
Professor Feldblum, lead legal counsel for the disability and
civil rights communities in Washington, D.C. during the three-year
negotiations on the Americans with Disabilities Act, explains that
the ambiguity in § 12112(d)(4)(A) resulted from a substantial
policy disagreement between the Bush Administration negotiators
and the Senate sponsors of the ADA concerning the Wards Cove
issue-a policy disagreement that both the Administration
negotiators and Senate sponsors chose not to resolve through the
text of the statute. 36 The Administration and Senate negotiators
intended to devise a standard in which employers could demand
that an employee undergo a medical examination if the
examination would help determine whether the employee could
actually continue to perform the essential functions of the job.37
But they
found it difficult to set forth the standard in a few
3
words. K
The problem the Administration faced was that the standard
was to be used for two purposes: (i) as a limitation on medical
examinations and inquiries of current employees; and (ii) as the
standard for determining whether neutral qualification standards
had a disparate impact on people with disabilities. 39 The
Administration did not want to have any language in the ADA that
would adversely affect its stance that the United States Supreme
Court, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,40 had correctly

36. See Feldblum, supra note 29, at 546-47.
37. Id. at 546.
38. Id. An earlier ADA bill stated that any medical examination used had to
be shown by the employer "to be necessary and substantially related to the
ability of the individual to perform the essential functions of the particular
employment position." 135 Cong. Rec. S4979-02, S4989 (May 9, 1989).
39. See, e.g., Feldblum, supranote 29, at 546-47.
40. 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Cota
v. Tuscon Police Dept., 783 F. Supp. 458 (D. Ariz. 1992). In Wards Cove, the
Supreme Court determined that neutral business practices that had a
discriminatory racial impact were permissible so long as the challenged practice
served the legitimate goals of the employer in a significant way. Id. at 659, 109
S. Ct. at 2126. The touchtone of the inquiry was a "reasoned review" of the
employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice. Id. The Supreme
Court rejected the view that the challenged practice must be "indispensable" or
"essential" to the employer's business to pass muster. Id. It also outlined the
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applied a lenient standard for the "business necessity" defense. 4'
Indeed, the Administration and many members of Congress
desired to have the Wards Cove conception of "business necessity"
incorporated into the ADA. 42 In contrast, the civil rights
community and some of the Senate sponsors desired to overturn

burdens of proof and persuasion in a disparate impact case. Id. at 659-61, 109
S. Ct. at 2126-27. The civil rights community viewed the Wards Cove
conception of business necessity as a repudiation of the arguably more stringent
conception of business necessity first announced by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971). In Griggs, the
Court had established that disparate impact theory as a viable one under Title
VII. The civil rights community also disagreed with the burdens placed on
disparate impact plaintiffs by the Wards Cove decision. In response to the
criticism of the Wards Cove decision, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991 (1991 Act). Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Section 105 of
the 1991 Act amended Title VII to expressly recognize disparate impact claims,
alter the burdens of proof and persuasion outlined in Wards Cove, and provide
for a business necessity defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1995). While the
1991 Act made clear that the burden of proving business necessity is on the
employer, it did not make clear whether a stringent, medium, or lenient
conception of business necessity was intended for purposes of Title VII
disparate impact law. Section 105(b) of the 1991 Act states than an interpretive
memorandum issued by former Senator John Danforth is the only reliable
legislative history concerning the meaning of the term "business necessity."
That memorandum is not of great help, however, because it merely states that
Congress used the term to reflect the business necessity concepts enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griggs and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Wards Cove. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15472-01, S15485 (Oct. 30, 1991)
(statement by Sen. Kennedy); C. Geoffrey Weirich, Employment Discrimination
Law § II.B, at 82 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that "there is substantial disagreement
over the meaning of Griggsand of other pre-Wards Cove decisions."). In short,
it is fair to say that the 1991 Act did not resolve the debate concerning the
appropriate business necessity standard applicable to Title VII disparate impact
cases. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 607 (1st
Cir. 1995) (meaning and scope of business necessity defense "are blurred at the
edges" and the 1991 Act "did little to sharpen the focus."). Not surprisingly, the
federal courts of appeal have varied as to whether "business necessity" should
be given a strict or lenient interpretation in post-1991 Act disparate impact
cases. See, e.g., Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d
478, 485-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (strict standard); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2
F.3d 1112, 1119 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (lenient standard).
41. See, e.g., Feldblum, supranote 29, at 546.
42. See, e.g., Arlene Mayerson, Title I-Employment Provisions of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 499, 511 (1991).
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the Wards Cove decision and clearly did not want the Wards Cove
of business necessity to be incorporated into the
conception
43
ADA.
The differences between the two sides led to an impasse. 44 To
bridge this chasm, both sides agreed that the ADA would use the
term "job-related and consistent with business necessity" because
that term had some direct precedent in case law developed under
the Section 504 regulations.4a While they also agreed that the
statute itself would not explicitly define the term, nevertheless, it
was decided that forthcoming committee reports could be used to
define the term. 46 The committee reports therefore are relevant to
the extent they provide insight into the Congressional
understanding of business necessity. As explained later in this
article, mandatory periodic medical examinations of remotelocation employees fit within the general principles outlined in the
committee reports.
B. MedicalExaminationsofEmployees- The EEOC's View
Absent situations in which periodic medical examinations are
required of employees by state or federal law, 47 the EEOC limits
43. Id.
44. See Feldblum, supranote 29, at 546.
45. Id. at 547.
46. Id.
47. The legislative history of the ADA demonstrates that § 12112(d)(4) did
not overturn federal, state, and local laws that require certain categories of
employees to submit to mandatory periodic medical examinations. See House
Labor Report, supra note 20, at 74. For example, federal regulations require
certain categories of employees in the private sector to submit to mandatory
periodic medical examinations as part of their fitness-for-duty certification
process. These include, but are not limited to, commercial truck drivers,
commercial airline pilots, marine pilots, and hoist operators in open pit mines.
See 49 C.F.R. §§ 39.41, 39.45 (2005) (commercial motor vehicle operators must
submit to mandatory physical examination every twenty-four months as part of
licensing requirement); 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.121, 61.23, 67.201 (2005) (commercial
pilots must undergo annual medical examination as part of licensing
requirement); 46 C.F.R. § 10.709 (2005) (marine pilots who pilot vessels that
weigh more than 1600 tons and over must submit to annual medical
examinations); 30 C.F.R. § 56.19057 (2005) (no person shall operate a hoist in a
mine unless the person has had a medical examination by a qualified, licensed
physician within the preceding twelve months and is certified by the physician
to perform the hoisting duty). Federal law also requires certain categories of
federal employees to submit to mandatory periodic medical examinations. See 5
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periodic medical examinations to employees in positions affecting
public safety.48 Even then, these examinations must be narrowly
tailored to address specific job-related concerns. 49 The EEOC
notes that police officers and firefighters
are examples of jobs that
50
exception.
safety
public
the
within
fit

C.F.R. § 339.205 (2005) (federal agencies may establish periodic medical
examination programs by written policies or directives to safeguard the health of
employees whose work may subject them or others to significant health or safety
risks due to occupational or environmental exposure or demands). These
include, but are not limited to, nuclear materials couriers, firefighters, and air
traffic controllers. See United States Office of Personnel Management,
Qualification Standards for General Schedule Positions, in Operating Manual §§
IV-B-20 (Aug. 1994) ("Before entrance on duty and periodically during
employment, applicants for and employees in [nuclear courier positions] must
undergo a medical examination and be physically and medically capable of
performing the essential duties of the position efficiently and without hazard to
themselves or others."), IV-B-14 ("Employees in positions involving firefighting
or other duties involving arduous physical exertion may be subject to periodic
(e.g., annual) medical examinations following appointment to determine fitness
for continued performance of the duties of the position."), IV-B-278 (air traffic
controllers must requalify for their positions in an annual medical examination,
usually given during the employee's month of birth).
48. See EEOC, Questionsand Answers, supra note 19, at Question 18.
49. Id.
50. The public safety exception does not require state and city-police and
fire departments to enact policies that mandate current police officers and fire
fighters submit to periodic medical examinations. It only makes such policies
permissible.
Nonetheless, prudent departments should require such
examinations of their employees. The National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), a leading organization aimed at protecting the safety of firefighters,
recommends that all fire departments conduct mandatory medical examinations
of their members in order to identify medical conditions that affect a member's
ability to safely perform essential job tasks, monitor the effects of exposure to
chemicals, detect patterns of disease or injury that could indicate underlying
work-related problems, and provide members with information about their
current health. See National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1582: Standard
on Comprehensive Occupational Medical Program for Fire Departments §§ 7.17.3 (2003). This recommendation is partly due to the increase in occurrences of
on-duty heart attacks and cardiac arrests among fire fighters. See National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality
Investigation Report F2003-9 (July
13,
1994),
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face200339.html (career firefighter in Tennessee died
of sudden cardiac arrest in parking lot of fire station); NIOSH Fire Fighter
Fatality Investigation Report 99F-11 (May 3, 1999), available at
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In general, the EEOC's view is that, unless periodic medical
examinations are required by law or fit within the narrow public
safety exception, medical examinations of current employees are
"job-related and consistent with business necessity" only when the
employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence,
that: (i) an employee's ability to perform essential job functions
will be impaired by a medical condition or (ii) an employee will
pose a direct threat due to a medical condition. 1 According to the
EEOC's enforcement guidance, this standard may be met when:
an employer observes symptoms indicating that an employee may
have a medical condition that will impair his or her ability to
perform essential job functions or will pose a direct threat; an
employer knows about a particular employee's medical condition,
has observed performance problems, and reasonably can attribute
the problems to the medical condition; or an employer receives
reliable information from a credible third party that indicates the
employee has a medical condition that will impair his or52her ability
to perform essential job functions or pose a direct threat.

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face9911.html (career firefighter in West Virginia
died of sudden cardiac arrest during a training drill). Not surprisingly, many of
these incidents occurred in fire departments that do not conduct periodic medical
examinations of the fire fighters. Id. Although not required by federal law,
more and more police and fire departments are requiring periodic examinations
as a condition of continued employment. See Collective Bargaining Agreement
Between Polk County Board of County Commissioners and Polk County
Professional Firefighters, I.A.F.F., Local 3531, Article XVI, (Oct. 1, 2003-Sept.
30, 2004), available at http://www.polk-county.net/county-offices/firesvcs/
contract.htmi (fire fighters in Polk County, Florida required to undergo annual
medical examinations); Agreement Between Township of Hardyton, Sussex
County, New Jersey and Hardyton Township PBA Local 374, Article XIX, (Jan.
1, 2004-Dec. 31, 2006) (on file with the author) (police officers in Hardyton,
New Jersey must submit to annual medical examination to insure proper
physical capabilities on the job).
51. See EEOC, QuestionsandAnswers, supra note 19, at Question 5.
52. Id.
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III. A BETTER APPROACH
A. LegitimateBusiness PurposeStandard
The EEOC's position is inconsistent with the purpose of §
12112(d)(4)(A), the ADA legislative history, and its own
interpretive guidance. The term "job-related and consistent with
business necessity" in (d)(4)(A) should be construed to allow
employers to require periodic medical examinations of current
employees when those examinations serve a legitimate business
purpose. Because employers who hire workers for jobs that
involve arduous, dangerous work in remote locations have a
legitimate business interest in requiring such employees to submit
to mandatory periodic medical examinations, such employers
should be allowed to require such examinations without running
afoul of the ADA.
1. Purposeof the "BusinessNecessity" Defense in §
12112(d)(4)(A)
As described in Part II(A)(3) of this article, Congress and the
Bush Administration could not ag'ee on how to define the business
necessity standard in the ADA.
Does the business necessity
language incorporate a lenient or strict interpretation of the term?
The Bush Administration and Congress opted not to make this
clear in the statute. There is no definition of "job-related and
consistent with business necessity" in the text of the ADA. 54 As
explained later, a lenient standard should apply.
Section 12112(d)(4)(A) provides that an employer can require
an employee to submit to a medical examination if such
53. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 29, at 547.
54. The term "job-related and consistent with business necessity" is found
in three separate provisions of the ADA. Section 12112(a)(6) prohibits an
employer from using "qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria" that screen out disabled individuals or a class of disabled
individuals unless the standard, test, or other criteria is shown to be "job-related
for the positions in question and is consistent with business necessity." Section
12113(a) provides that it is a defense to a charge of discrimination under section
12112(a)(6) that the qualification standard, test, or selection criteria used by the
employer "has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation." Section 12112(d)(4)(A) prohibits an employer from requiring
a medical examination of a current employee unless the examination "is shown
to be job-related and consistent with business necessity."
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examination is job-related and consistent with business
necessity. The statute does not define the "business necessity"
term. Nor does it limit the situations in which an employer can
attempt to prove that a required medical examination is a
business necessity.
Thus, when an employer institutes a
mandatory periodic medical examination policy to protect its
employees from health and safety risks, it should have the
opportunity to demonstrate that such a policy is job-related and
consistent with business necessity. Protecting employees from
health and safety risks
qualifies as an important business goal
55
for ADA purposes.
To be sure, it is not enough for the employer to simply assert
that the mandatory periodic medical examination policy is
needed for safety reasons. The employer must present evidence
that the policy furthers legitimate safety interests. But the
employer should not be precluded from asserting this type of
defense.
Unfortunately, this is exactly what the EEOC's position
does. It operates as a per se rule to prevent employers from
even attempting to prove that their mandatory periodic medical
examination policy meets the business necessity standard. The
EEOC's position does not comport with the plain 56language of
the statute and should not be followed by the courts.

55. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045
(2002).
56. The EEOC's position-as evidenced in its Enforcement Guidance,
litigating position, and the informal opinion letter-lacks the force of law and is
not binding on the courts. See O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d, 998,
1009 (7th Cir. 2002) (ADA Enforcement Guidance constitutes a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort to for guidance, but does not bind a court); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 485, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2414 n.3 (1991) (EEOC's litigating position in recent
lawsuits is entitled to little, if any, deference); Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 587, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2000) (opinion letters lack the force of
law and do not require Chevron-style deference); Theodore W. Wern, Note,
Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretationsof the Civil Rights Act, the ADA,
and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1533,
1575-76 (1999) (noting that, according to the majority of the Supreme Court,
EEOC enforcement guidance only qualifies for earned deference under
Skidmore).

20061

ADA

699

2. ADA LegislativeHistory
a. Business Necessity and QualificationStandardsunderthe
ADA
The concept of "job-related and consistent with business
necessity" is explained primarily in the part of the ADA legislative
history that deals with qualification standards that have a disparate
impact on the disabled.57 The concept is also discussed in the
section of the ADA legislative history that addresses medical
examinations and inquiries of employees. 58 I examine the concept
as it relates to qualification standards at the outset so I can later
demonstrate the subtle differences between qualification standards
that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity" and
periodic medical examinations that are "job-related and consistent
with business necessity."
The legislative history reveals that Congress desired to prevent
an employer from utilizing selection criterion that did not measure
the applicant or employee's ability to perform the essential
functions of the job, with or without a reasonable
accommodation. 9 The Labor Reports of60 both the House and the
Senate cite and discuss Stutts v. Freeman as an example of a case
in which an employer's neutral selection criteria was not "jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.",6' Immediately
after the discussion of Stutts, the Labor Reports state:
57. See House Labor Report, supranote 20, at 70-72; Senate Labor Report,
supranote 29, at 37-39; House Judiciary Report, supranote 20, at 42.
58. See House Labor Report, supranote 20, at 74-75; Senate Labor Report,
supranote 29, at 39-40; House Judiciary Report, supra note 20, at 43-44.
59. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 71; Senate Labor Report,
supranote 29, at 37-38.
60. 694 F.2d 666 (llth Cir. 1983).
61. In Stutts, a dyslexic applicant was denied the job of heavy equipment
operator because he could not pass a written test used by the employer for
entering the training program, which was a prerequisite for the job. See House
Labor Report, supra note 20, at 71; Senate Labor Report, supra note 29, at 38.
It was undisputed that the applicant could safely perform the job of heavy
equipment operator in spite of his dyslexia. Id. The dyslexia only interfered
with his ability to perform on the written test and meet the outside reading
requirements of the training program. Stutts, 694 F.2d at 669 n.3. The Eleventh
Circuit held that, even if passing the written test and satisfying the reading
requirements of the training program itself were necessary criteria to work as a
heavy equipment operator, the employer violated Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act because the employer had not provided the applicant with a
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Hence, the requirement that job selection procedures be
"job-related and consistent with business necessity"
underscores the need to examine all selection criteria to
assure that they not only provide an accurate measure of an
applicant's actual ability to perform the essential functions
of the job, but that even if they do provide such a measure,
a disabled
applicant is offered
a "reasonable
accommodation" to meet the criteria that relate to the
functions of the job.62
To the casual observer, the above-quoted passage from both the
House and Senate Labor Reports may indicate that the Stutts court
had interpreted the phrase "job-related and consistent with business
necessity." This is not the case, however. Interestingly enough,
the Stutts opinion never mentions the phrase "business necessity,"
although the opinion does raise the question of whether the written
test and training program are job-related.6 3 Therefore, while the
Stutts case provides a flavor of Congressional intent, we are still
left searching for the meaning of the term "job-related and
consistent with business necessity" as it relates to qualification
standards.
Is a neutral selection criterion that actually measures an
applicant's ability to perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without a reasonable accommodation, nonetheless
prohibited by § 12112(a)(6) if such a selection criteria is not
essential or indispensable to the employer's business? The House
Judiciary Report is no more illuminating than the Senate Labor and
House Labor Reports on this question.
The House Judiciary Report states that if an employer uses a
facially neutral qualification standard that has a discriminatory
effect on persons with disabilities, "this practice would be
discriminatory unless the employer can demonstrate that it is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity." 64 The report then
cites Prewitt v. United States Postal Service6 5 for interpretive
support. Prewitt, a notable Rehabilitation Act case, states that the

reasonable accommodation-i.e., the opportunity to take an oral version of the
test for admission to the training program and to engage a professional reader to
assist him with the reading requirements of the training program. Id.
62. House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 72; Senate Labor Report, supra
note 29, at 38.
63. 694 F.2d at 669 n.3.
64. House Judiciary Report, supra note 20, at 42.
65. 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
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employer bears the burden of proof when asserting a "business
necessity" defense as related to a neutral qualification standard.66
But it is ambivalent on the exact contours of the term "job-related
and consistent with business necessity," other than to indicate that
the business necessity principles asserted in Griggsv. Duke Power,
Co. 6 7 should apply to claims, by the disabled, that assert neutral
qualification standards and have a disparate impact in violation of
§ 12112(a)(6). 68 Asserting that the principles of Griggs apply
hardly answers the question posed by the Supreme Court's
fractured view of the Griggsconception of "business necessity" in
the Court's Wards Cove69 decision and the political debate
concerning the meaning of business necessity under Title7 VII.7 °
Pointing to a case that merely cites Griggs is not much help. 1
Turning away from the legislative history for the moment, the
remaining avenue to discern Congressional intent on this question
is the Rehabilitation Act,72 its accompanying regulations, case law
interpretations of the Act, and regulations that existed prior to the
passage of the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act is relevant to the
ADA conception of business necessity for two reasons. First, the
ADA states that Rehabilitation Act standards are applicable to the
ADA.73 Second, the ADA drafters used the term "business
66. Id. at 306; Feldblum, supra note 29, at 547 n. 149.
67. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
68. Prewitt,662 F.2d at 306-07.
69. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Cota v. Tuscon Police Dept., 783 F. Supp. 458
(D. Ariz. 1992).
70. See, e.g., Michael Carvin, DisparateImpact Claims Under the New Title
VII, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1153, 1157--64 (1993) (arguing that the Wards Cove
conception of business necessity is still good law after the Civil Rights Act of
1991); but see, e.g., Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The BusinessNecessity
Standard, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 896 (1993) (contending that the Wards Cove
conception does not survive the Act).
71. See discussion supra note 40.
72. "The Rehabilitation Act [of 1973] was the first major federal law
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of 'handicap."' See Richard
R. Carlson, Carlson's Federal Employment Laws Annotated, Employment
Discrimination, Chapter 4 (2002 ed.). The Act applies to entities that accept
federal funds.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1995) ("In General.-Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
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necessity" because that term had been present in some
Rehabilitation Act cases.74 The Rehabilitation Act cases bear
more fruit on the question.
A Department of Labor regulation, applicable to entities that
accept funds from the department, interprets Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and provides that job qualifications "which
would tend to exclude handicapped individuals because of their
handicap ... shall be related to the specific job or jobs for which
the individual is being considered and shall be consistent with
business necessity and safe performance., 75 Bentivegna v. United
States Department of Labor,76 the leading case interpreting the
business necessity language in the above regulation, warns courts
not to confuse business necessity with mere expediency and states
that job qualifications that exclude handicapped individuals must
be "directly connected with, and must substantially promote"
business necessity and safe performance.
It also plants the seed
that certain medical conditions are incompatible with jobs that
carry high risks of injury. 78
Another Rehabilitation Act case, E.E. Black, Limited v.
Marshall,79 provides additional insight into the concept of business
necessity. In Black, the district court considered a Department of
Labor regulation, applicable to federal contractors, which
interprets Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 80 The regulation
states that whenever a federal contractor applies qualification
requirements that tend to screen out qualified handicapped
individuals, "the requirements shall be related to the specific job or
jobs for which the individual is being considered and shall be
consistent with business necessity and the safe performance of the

pursuant to such title."); Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota
Sidestep: Dancing Around the EEOC's "Disability Regulations" Under the
ADA, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 177, 183 (2004) ("The ADA explicitly states that
its protections extend as far as the protections offered by Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act and its accompanying regulations.").
74. See Feldblum, supra note 29, at 547.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (2005).
76. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 621-22.
78. Id. at 623 n.3 (opining that job requirements directly tied to increased
risks of injury might present a valid justification for rejecting a handicapped
individual when the job carries elevated risks of injury).
79. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
80. Id. at 1103.
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job.'
The Black court hypothesized a scenario in which an
employer screened out a qualified handicapped individual on the
basis of a possible future injury and concluded that in some cases
such a qualification standard could be both consistent with
business necessity and the safe performance of the job if the risk of
injury was substantial and imminent. 82 Both Bentivegna and Black
elucidate a conception of business necessity that is less stringent
than one that would require an employer to prove a neutral
qualification standard, which has a disparate impact on the
disabled, is essential or indispensable to the employer's business.
b. Business Necessity andPeriodicMedical Examinations
The legislative history concerning the conception of business
necessity in § 12112(d)(4)(A) indicates that periodic medical
examinations are "job-related and consistent with business
necessity" so long as they serve a legitimate business purpose. For
good reason, this conception of business necessity is even more
lenient than under ADA qualifications standards and Title VII
disparate impact law.
Qualification
standards
are different from medical
examinations. If an applicant is not hired or an employee is fired
because of a qualification standard that has a disparate impact on
the disabled or a protected category under Title VII, that person
suffers an economic loss. 83 In contrast, merely taking a medical
examination does not cause the employee to suffer an economic
loss. The medical examination impinges on his or her privacy
interests and could perhaps stigmatize the individual, but the
economic effects of an adverse employment action do not exist.
Because the interests underlying the regulation of qualification
standards and medical examinations vary and the degree to which
the law should protect those interests also vary, it would make
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1104 (employer can validly deny a qualified handicapped
individual a particular job if it was determined that the individual would have a

ninety percent chance of suffering a heart attack within one month if given the
particular job because such a job requirement would be consistent both with
business necessity and the safe performance of the job).
83. Not all adverse employment actions taken against employees due to
their failure to meet qualification standards necessarily have economic
consequences. For example, an employee's change in job duties due to his or
her failure to meet a qualification standard without a corresponding decrease in
the employee's pay would not have an adverse economic impact on the
employee.
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sense for Congress to treat those interests differently through
different conceptions of the business necessity defense. In my
view, the legislative history calls for different conceptions. 84 An
important strand of the legislative history reflects the notion that
medical examinations of current employees are permissible if they
serve a legitimate business purpose.
The House Labor, House Judiciary, and Senate Labor Reports
all speak of medical examinations meeting the "job-related and
consistent with business necessity" standard if they serve
"legitimate employer purposes" or an employer's "legitimate
needs." 85 Similar language is not used in the part of the legislative
history that discusses business necessity as it relates to
qualification standards under the ADA. Instead, the qualification
standards concept of business necessity focuses on reasonable
accommodation and clarifies that a reasonable accommodation
86
may entail adopting an alternative, less discriminatory criterion.
This suggests the medical examination conception of business
necessity is something akin to the qualification standard
conception outlined in Bentivegna and Black, the Rehabilitation
Act cases, and considerably less strict than the business necessity
interpretation that some courts have applied 87in Title VII disparate
impact cases after the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,
213, 121 S. Ct. 1433, 1441 (2001) (the meaning of the same words can
sometimes vary to suit the purposes of the law).
85. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 75 ("An inquiry or medical
examination that is not job-related serves no legitimate employer purpose, but
simply serves to stigmatize the person with a disability. An employer's
legitimate needs will be met by allowing those medical inquiries and
examinations which are job-related and consistent with business necessity."
(emphasis added)); Senate Labor Report, supra note 29, at 39-40 ("An inquiry
or medical examination that is not job-related serves no legitimate employer
purpose, but simply serves to stigmatize the person with a disability. An
employer's legitimate needs will be met by allowing the medical inquiries and
examinations which are job-related." (emphasis added)); House Judiciary
Report, supranote 20, at 44 ("An inquiry or medical examination that is not jobrelated serves no legitimate employer purpose, but simply serves to stigmatize
the person with a disability .... Legitimate needs of the employer are met by
allowing job-related medical examinations and inquiries." (emphasis added)).
86. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 71; Senate Labor Report,
supranote 29, at 38.
87. See Lanning v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 490 (3d
Cir. 1999) (business necessity defense under Title VII requires more than a
legitimate business reason because "a business necessity standard that wholly
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Another telling portion of the legislative history demonstrates
that, with respect to medical examinations of current employees,
Congress was most concerned about medical examinations that
single out an employee on the ground of a perceived disability
because being identified as disabled often carries with it a stigma.
The House Labor, House Judiciary, and Senate Labor Reports each
provide the example of an employer who requires an employee to
be tested for cancer after witnessing him or her start to lose a
significant amount of hair.88 The reports explain such tests should
not be permitted unless they are job-related and consistent with
business necessity because the individual with cancer may object
to being identified as disabled, independent of the consequences,
because such identification often carries a stigma. 89 The protected
interest, according to Congress, is the prevention of a stigma. 90 If
that is so, periodic medical examinations of current employees in a
job category are less problematic than ad hoc examinations based
on observation of an individual employee because periodic exams
do not identify an individual as disabled. If all employees in a job

defers to an employer's judgment is completely inadequate in combating covert
discrimination based upon societal prejudices"). The legal principle that
different interpretations may be given to the same language-whether appearing
in separate statutes or in separate provision of the same statute-upon a showing
of Congressional intent finds considerable support in the law. Justice O'Connor,
in her separate opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1549
(2005) (O'Conner, J., concurring), applied this principle, concluding that a
disparate impact theory is not cognizable under the ADEA even though the
ADEA contains similar language to Title VII because the perceived purposes of
the statutes were different. Justice O'Connor cited a number of Supreme Court
cases in which the same phrase appeared in separate provisions of the same
statute, but had been interpreted to have different meanings. Id. at 1556-57
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581, 595-97, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1245-47 (2004) ("age" has different
meaning where used in different parts of the ADEA); United States v. Cleveland
Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 121 S.Ct. 1433 (2001) ("wages paid" has
different meanings in different provisions of Title 26 U.S.C.); Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44, 117 S.Ct. 843, 847 (1997) ("employee" has
different meanings in different provisions of Title VII)).
88. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 75; Senate Labor Report,
supra note 29, at 39-40; House Judiciary Report, supra note 20, at 44.
89. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 75; Senate Labor Report,
supra note 29, at 39-40; House Judiciary Report, supra note 20, at 44.
90. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 75; Senate Labor Report,
supra note 29, at 39-40; House Judiciary Report, supra note 20, at 44.
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category are required to take a periodic medical examination, no
stigma should attach to the taking of the examination. For this
reason, periodic medical examinations should have an easier time
fitting into the "legitimate business purpose" standard-at least in
certain high-risk jobs.
Although a legitimate business purpose standard is detailed in
the legislative history, this standard is not directly mentioned
during the discussion of periodic medical examinations. The
House Labor Report upholds periodic medical examinations that
are required by law and notes that periodic medical examinations
9
could be appropriate in jobs that impact public safety. '
Nonetheless, the House Labor Report does not shut the door on
expanding the allowance of periodic medical examinations to other
dangerous jobs not covered by those situations when such
examinations serve a legitimate business purpose. The House
Labor Report provides periodic medical exams required by law
and periodic exams permitted due to public safety as examples of
situations in which periodic medical exams of employees are jobrelated consistent with business necessity. 92 It does not state that
91. The House Labor Report states in pertinent part:
[42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)] prohibits medical exams of employees
unless job-related and consistent with business necessity. Certain jobs
require periodic physicals in order to determine fitness for duty. For
example, Federal safety regulations require bus and truck drivers to
have a medical exam at least biennially. In certain industries, such as
air transportation, physical qualifications for some employees are
critical. Those employees, for example, pilots, may have to meet
medical standards established by Federal, State, or local law or
regulation, or otherwise fulfill requirements for obtaining a medical
certificate, as a prerequisite for employment. In other instances,
because a particular job function may have a significant impact on
public safety, e.g. flight attendants, an employee's state of health is
important in establishing job qualifications, even though a medical
certificate may not be required by law. The Committee does not intend
for this Act to override any medical standards or requirements
established by Federal, State or local law as a prerequisite for
performing a particular job, if the medical standards are consistent with
this Act (or in the case of federal standards, if they are consistent with
section 504--that is, if they are job-related and consistent with
business necessity. See, e.g., Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227
(3d Cir. 1983).
See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 74.
92. Id. at 74 ("Certain jobs require periodic physicals in order to determine
fitness for duty. Forexample, Federal safety regulations require .... In other
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periodic medical examinations are job-related and consistent with
business necessity only if those two situations apply. 93 Thus, an
employer should have the opportunity to demonstrate that its
mandatory periodic medical examinations policy meets the
business necessity standard because the policy protects the health
and safety of its employees.
3. InterpretiveGuidance
In addition to finding support in the legislative history, a
legitimate business purpose standard is also consistent with certain
language in the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 94 The Interpretive
Guidance states that the purpose of a key regulation 95 governing
medical examinations of current employees is "to prevent the
administration to employees of medical tests ...that do not serve a
legitimate business purpose."96 The Interpretive Guidance also
medical
construes another key regulation 97 concerning
examinations of current employees to permit employers to "require
medical examinations (fitness for duty exams) when there is a need
to determine whether an employee98is still able to perform the
essential functions of his or her job."
Conversely, the EEOC's litigation position, enforcement
guidance, informal opinion letter, and some parts of the

instances,because a particular job function may have an impact on public safety
(emphasis added)).
....
93. Id. at 74.
94. The ADA required the EEOC to issue regulations within one year of the
ADA's enactment to carry out Title I. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1995). The EEOC
issued its regulations on July 26, 1991. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2004). At the
same time, the EEOC also issued an appendix to the regulations entitled
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2004). The Interpretive Guidance interprets the EEOC's
regulations and explains the major concepts of disability rights. 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. (2004). The EEOC complied with the notice and comment provisions
of the Administrative Procedures Act for the regulations and Interpretive
See Barbara Hoffman, Reports of Its Death Were Greatly
Guidance.
Exaggerated: The EEOC's Regulations that Define Disability Under the ADA
after Sutton v. United Air Lines, 9 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 253, 258-59
(2000).
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(b).
96. Id. § 1630.13(b) (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 1630.14(c).
98. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.14(c) (emphasis added).
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Interpretive Guidance appear to prohibit all periodic medical
examinations unless required by law or contained within the
narrowed public safety exception. 99 The EEOC's litigation
position, enforcement guidance, and opinion letter appear to be at
odds with the language of the interpretive guidance, which, in my
mind, is expansive enough to allow periodic medical examinations
of employees in high-risk jobs. The Interpretive Guidance
provides that the main purpose of the EEOC regulations is to
prevent medical examination of current employees that do not
serve a legitimate business purpose.I°° It also states that employers
are permitted to require medical examinations when there is "a
need to determine whether an employee is still able to perform the
essential functions of his or her job,"' 01 not when there is an
"essential" need or a "compelling" need. Some courts have
interpreted this language to mean that "job-related and consistent
with business necessity" has a more flexible connotation than it
does under traditional disparate impact law.l°2 The inconsistency
between the Interpretive Guidance and the EEOC's litigation
position, enforcement guidance, and opinion letter is a persuasive
reason for the courts to refuse to defer to the EEOC on such an
important issue as whether periodic medical examinations of

99. See Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Murray, Inc., 175 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (EEOC argued that company's periodic
medical examination policy, which applied to all forklift operators, violated 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) because medical screening was not prompted by
individual employee behavior); EEOC, Questions and Answers, supra note 19,
at Questions 5 and 18 (periodic medical examinations only allowed for
employees who work in positions affecting public safety); Letter from Joyce
Walker-Jones, supranote 9, at 1-2 (medical examination limited to situations in
which employer has individualized suspicion of employee's inability to perform
essential functions or employees work in positions affecting public safety); 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.14(c) (EEOC regulation permits periodic physicals
that are required by law in that they are job-related and consistent with business
necessity).
100. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.13(b).
101. Id. § 1630.14(c).
102. See Riechmann v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (D.
Kan. 2001) (interpreting the EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance" to permit
employers to make periodic medical inquiries of current employees if such
inquiries serve the legitimate business purpose of the employer even though they
do not serve a "compelling" need, an "immediate" need, or a need which is of
"great importance" to the employer, because Guidance makes clear that
disparate impact principles do not apply).
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employees in high-risk jobs, like offshore oil workers, are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.l°3
4. Summary
In summary, a "legitimate business purpose" standard should
apply to mandatory periodic medical examinations. The next
section explains why permitting employers to require periodic
medical examinations of remote-location employees fits within this
standard.
B. PeriodicMedical Examinationsof Remote-Location Employees
Employers that conduct remote-location operations have
workplace safety concerns that other employers do not. The
remoteness of the location makes it difficult for employees who
suffer on-the-job injuries to receive expedient medical attention.
In addition, many remote-location operations involve inherently
dangerous jobs. To protect the safety of these employees, the
employer has a legitimate business interest in requiring mandatory
periodic medical examinations of these employees.
While the dangers involved in remote-location work are
substantial, federal law typically does not require employees in
these jobs to maintain medical certificates as part of a licensing
requirement.1° 4 Nor do these jobs fit squarely within the public
safety exception set forth in the ADA legislative histor and
adopted by the EEOC through its enforcement guidance.' ° But
103. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1560 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[I]t makes little sense to attribute to the agency [the EEOC] a construction
of the relevant statutory text that the agency itself has not actually
articulated so that we can then "defer" to that reading. Such an approach is
particularly troubling where applied to a question as weighty as whether a
statute [the ADEA] does or does not subject employers to liability absent
discriminatory intent.
This is not, in my view, what Chevron
contemplated.
Id.
104. See Feldblum, supra note 29.
105. Although remote-location positions may not always fit squarely within
the public safety exception, they may fit within the spirit of the exception. Take
the offshore oil rig employees, for example. Offshore employees are not police
officers or firefighters, but they work in an environment in which their ability to
perform their jobs without posing a direct threat to others affects the safety of all
those who live and work on the rig. See Request for Technical Assistance,
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the rationale for permitting or requiring periodic medical
examinations of commercial motor vehicle operators, commercial
airline pilots, marine pilots, air-traffic controllers, mine hoisters,
nuclear materials couriers, firefighters, and police officers should
also permit remote-location employers to require remote-location
employees that work 0 in
6 dangerous jobs to submit to periodic
medical examinations.1
For each of these positions, catastrophic injury could result to
the employee and others if the employee has a health condition that
renders him or her unfit for duty. The offshore oil rig example
illustrates these points. The offshore employer operates Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in the Gulf of Mexico. 10 7 The
jobs on the MODUs include, but are not limited to, rig manager,
driller, assistant driller, derrickman, foreman, crane operator,
roustabout, rig maintenance supervisor, ballast control operator,
electrician, mechanic, motorman, welder, subsea engineer barge
engineer, materials coordinator, and training specialist.1A The
offshore employees who work in jobs that require them to aid in
the navigation of the MODUs-the rig manager, barge engineer,

supra note 3, at 4. Stated another way, because the rig itself is a self-enclosed
community, the employees on the rig are the public. Id. Furthermore, offshore
employees actually perform traditional public-safety functions in the event of an
emergency on the rig. Id. Offshore employers may require offshore employees
to have training in emergency-life saving situations. Id. at n.10. In addition,
Coast Guard regulations required offshore employers to designate certain
offshore employees as lifeboatmen and able seamen. Id. To obtain their
certification, lifeboatmen and able seamen must have emergency life-saving
training. 46 C.F.R. §§ 12.05-03, 12.10-13 (2005).
106. See supranote 47.
107. See Request for Technical Assistance, supra note 3, at 3. The ADA
applies to the employer even if the MODUs are not located in United States
waters because the ADA applies extraterritorially. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)
(2005); Id. § 12112(c). Section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended
the ADA to make clear that the protections of the ADA extend to American
citizens working overseas for American employers, effectively overruling
Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
See Enforcement Guidance on Application of Title VII and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct to Conduct Overseasand to ForeignEmployers Discriminating
in the United States, EEOC Guidance No. 915.002, § I.A.2, October 20, 1993,
available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/extraterritorial-vii-ada.html.
In
Boureslan, the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
did not apply extraterritorially. 499 U.S. at 248-49, 111 S. Ct. at 1230-31.
108. Id.
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ballast control operator, and subsea engineer employees-are
required by Coast Guard regulations to submit to periodic medical
For employees in the remaining positions, there
examinations.
is no legal requirement that they submit to periodic medical
examinations. Moreover, according to the EEOC, if the employer
requires those employees to submit to periodic medical
examinations, it violates § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA." 0
This should not be the case. Most of the offshore jobs on the
MODUs require the employee to either operate heavy machinery
or work in the presence of heavy machinery."' The dangers
inherent to the offshore oil rig-human error in the operation of
heavy machinery to name one-make it imperative that all
offshore employees be physically capable of performing their
essential job duties. 12
While other industrial employers may have similar safety
concerns, the company's concerns are heightened due to the
remoteness of the job site. 1 3 If an accident occurs in the typical
industrial setting, firefighters and emergency medical personnel
ordinarily are able to assist the employer immediately in a rescue
operation and the treatment of injuries. 14 Likewise, if an
employee has a heart attack or stroke, the employer can be
reasonably assured that it will obtain immediate medical assistance
for the employee. 15
The same cannot be said for offshore oil drilling companies. It
may take hours, or even days, to transport the injured employee by
helicopter from the MODU to a hospital. 116 Requiring periodic
medical examinations of all offshore workers would reducethrough early detection-the risk of incapacitating medical
109. Id. at 4. To obtain a merchant mariner's license, these employees must
undergo a physical examination. 46 C.F.R. § 10.205(d). To renew their license,
they must submit a medical certification to the Coast Guard. A licensed
physician or physician assistant must attest that the employee "is in good health
and has no physical impairment or medical condition which would render him or
her incompetent to perform the ordinary duties of that license."
Id. §
10.209(d)(1).
110. See sources cited supra note 9.
111. See Request for Technical Assistance, supranote 3, at 3.
112. Id.

113.

Id. at 3-4.

114. Id. at n.9
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3. See, e.g., Gulf Rig Workers Evacuate as Storm Approaches,
Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, Sept. 14, 2004, at D6 (evacuation of gulf rig
workers due to storms took several days).
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emergencies while on-duty, and thereby reduce the risk of
consequential catastrophic injury to co-workers. 117 In addition,
mandatory periodic medical examinations would save the lives of
employees who otherwise may be unaware of a life-threatening
impairment. 118
For example, assume the driller referred to earlier in the article
is required to submit to an annual medical examination by the
offshore employer."t 9 The examination reveals a heart defect
unknown to the driller 120 and results in emergency quadruple
bypass surgery, which saves the driller's life. 12 Consider what
could have happened had the driller not been required to submit to
the annual medical examination: the driller suffers a massive heart
attack while working on the rig, several employees are killed when
the driller loses control of the drawworks, and the driller dies
because the employer is not able to quickly transport him to the
nearest medical facility. 122 The mandatory periodic medical
examination prevented this catastrophe. 23 The need for offshore
117. See Request for Technical Assistance, supra note 3, at 4.
118. See, e.g., id. The recent cardiac problems experienced by former
President Bill Clinton illustrates that people with cardiovascular disease often do
not even realize the dire straits they are in. Although President Clinton looked
to be in good health, he was within a "cat's whisker of death" prior to checking
into the hospital. See, e.g., Editorial, Heart Risks, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal,

Sept. 20, 2004, at A5.
119. See Request for Technical Assistance, supra note 3, at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The devil's advocate will argue that once the driller's heart condition is
identified through a periodic medical examination, the employer will
immediately fire the driller. After the termination of employment, the driller
will then have no health insurance and will be unable to pay for any medical
treatment needed. The response to this excellent point is two-fold. First, most
employers are not heartless creatures. Many employers will have leave policies
which the driller could use to take time off to address the health issue. Absent a
leave policy, the driller should be able to take leave under the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, which allows a covered employee to take up to
twelve weeks unpaid leave to address his or her own serious health condition.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1999). An employer may also seek to temporarily
transfer the driller to a less dangerous job, while he seeks medical assistance for
his condition. Finally, if termination of employment occurs after exhaustion of
all leave options, the driller could keep his health insurance for up to eighteen
months through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA). Id. §§ 1161-69. COBRA Continuation Coverage is expensive for
the individual, but it may be the best option for certain employees who lose their
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oil companies to require offshore employees to submit to periodic
medical examinations for safety reasons is merely the tip of the
iceberg. There are undoubtedly other jobs where the remoteness of
the location and the nature of the job would sensibly lead the
employer to require the employees to submit to mandatory periodic
medical examinations.
A hypothetical company called BJG sets up an observatory in
the mountains of one of the islands of Hawaii. The observatory
houses one of the world's finest telescopes. The goal of the
company is to conduct astronomical research. Assume that BJG is
an "employer" under the ADA and is subject to Title I. Many
different types of employees work at the observatory---engineers,
The
computer workers, maintenance workers, guides, etc.
factor-high
environmental
a
peculiar
deal
with
employees have to
altitude. Therefore, BJG requires all staff members to submit to,
and pass, a High Altitude Physical Exam upon joining the
company. It also requires each staff member to submit to, and
pass, a High Altitude Physical Exam periodically during his or her
The frequency of the periodic exams varies
employment.
BJG requires periodic
depending on the age of the employee.'
mandatory medical examinations of all its employees for a very
good reason-to protect the safety of its employees. People with
certain medical conditions are at increased risk if they work in high
altitude conditions. Some of them may not even be aware that they
have a condition which places them at risk. There is also the
concern that employees who experience acute mountain sickness
while on duty may not be able to receive immediate medical
attention due to the remoteness of the location. For all of these
reasons, it makes sense for BJG to periodically require the
employees to undergo a medical examination to make sure that the
company is not placing them in harm's way by continuing to allow
them to work in such extreme conditions. Indeed, I would argue

job and have serious health conditions when the prospects of quickly obtaining a
new job that provides health benefits are uncertain.
124. This example is modeled on a real-world scenario. There is actually an
astronomy center located in Hawaii called the Joint Astronomy Centre (JAC).
See Joint Astronomy Centre, http://www.jach.hawaii.edu/. All JAC employees
who work above one of the mountains, Hale Pohaku, must undergo periodic
medical examinations due to the remoteness of the location and the high
altitude. See Joint Astronomy Centre, Mauna Kea Safety Policies General,
The
Chapter 9, § G2, http://www.jach.hawaii.edu/safety/chap9.htm#chap9b.
frequency of the periodic medical examinations depends on the age of the
employee. Id. § H4.
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that BJG would be negligent if it did not have such a requirement.
But, according to the EEOC, unless the examination is required by
state, federal, or local law, such a requirement violates the ADA.
An example from the government sector also proves the point.
The United States Department of State hires foreign service
employees. The employees must be fit for worldwide duty.
Should the government be prohibited from requiring those
employees to submit to periodic medical examinations prior to
assignment in remote outposts? One would think not, and that
appears to be the case. 125 Why should private-sector employers be
denied the flexibility some government agencies are given on this
issue? 26
Periodic medical examinations reduce the risk that medically
unfit workers will remain on the job in dangerous environments
and cause harm to themselves and others. They reduce the
employer's costs and exposure to potential liability that may arise
125. Foreign Service employees must be able to serve on a world-wide basis.
22 C.F.R. § 11.1 (e)(2) (2004). Often, such employees are required to serve in
remote parts of the world which present unusual health hazards and where
adequate medical care is non-existent. See Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.D.C. 1987).
Current Foreign Service employees must undergo periodic medical
examinations about every two to three years, typically upon a change of tour of
duty. 3 Foreign Affairs Manual § 680 (1992); Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 51.
The content of the examination is changed to reflect evolving medical practice.
Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 51-52. If significant health problems are detected,
the employees are prevented from serving in remote locations. Id. at 54
(upholding Department of State policy that prohibited HIV-positive foreign
service employees from serving in remote foreign posts due to inadequacy of
medical treatment in remote posts).
126. The United States Office of Personnel Management has promulgated a
regulation which gives each federal agency the authority to decide whether
federal employees in the agency must submit to periodic medical examinations.
See 5 C.F.R. § 339.205 (2005). The OPM regulations state that periodic medical
examinations must comply with EEOC regulations concerning periodic medical
examinations, which presumably means that periodic medical examinations are
available only if they are required by federal law or the public safety exception
applies. Id. § 339.103. But a careful look at the OPM regulation reveals that
OPM understands that unique occupational or environmental demands may
warrant periodic medical examinations. Id. § 339.205 ("Agencies may establish
periodic examination or immunization programs by written policies or directives
to safeguard the health of employees whose work may subject them or others to
significant health or safety risks due to occupationalorenvironmentalexposure
or demands." (emphasis added)).
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from workplace incidents caused by unfit workers. 127 Moreover,
these examinations help the employer adhere to 'its duty to

127. It goes without saying that the employer will suffer increased costs and
expenses-damage to equipment, lost work time, emergency rescue service
expenses, etc.-when a catastrophic accident occurs. The employer may also
face lawsuits from the injured employees. For example, in the offshore oil
accident example, the injured or dead workers, depending on the location of the
accident and the workers' employment status may have actions or claims under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1975) ("seaman" who suffers personal injury
or death in the course of employment may maintain negligence cause of action
against employer), Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901 (2001) and 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1986) ("employee" who suffers
disability or death resulting from an injury that occurs as a result of oil
operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf is entitled to workers'
compensation), or Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1975)
(negligence action against vessel or corporation available to personal
representative of decedent when the corporation's negligence led to the
employee's death on the high seas). It is questionable whether the offshore
employer could use the EEOC position that mandatory periodic medical
examinations of offshore employees are prohibited under the ADA to defend the
workers' claims that the employer negligently failed to maintain a safe
workplace because it assigned the driller to perform a job that his heart
condition precluded him from safely performing. See, e.g., Moreno v. Grand
Victoria Casino, 94 F. Supp. 2d 883, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("A Jones Act
employer owes a duty to assign employees to work for which they are
reasonably suited .... The employer is negligent if it knew or should have

known that the employer was unfit for the job because of his or health
condition." (emphasis added)). I have found no cases that address whether
employers sued under the Jones Act can hide behind the EEOC's interpretation
of the ADA as a shield to liability. But offshore oil employers cannot expect
that the alleged prohibition of mandatory periodic medical exams under the
ADA will necessarily provide a winning defense to the type of Jones Act claims
referred to above. In summary, the potential tort liability and the increased costs
associated with permitting medically unfit employees to work in remote-location
or dangerous-job positions, in combination with other reasons, tilts the balance
in favor of a finding that mandatory periodic medical examinations of remotelocation employees are job-related and consistent with business necessity. See,
e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 21218, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1210-13 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to employer's facially
discriminatory fetal protection policy could include considerations of potential
tort liability and increased costs); id. at 224, 111 S.Ct. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that "a shipping company may refuse to hire pregnant
women as crew members on long voyages because the on-board facilities for
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maintain a safe workplace.128 A periodic medical examination
requirement for employees in remote-location jobs serves a
legitimate business purpose and should be allowed
29 under the ADA
because it is consistent with business necessity.
C. Creatingthe Remote-Location Exception Through CaseLaw
The EEOC should make clear, through regulation or
enforcement guidance, that employers who require employees to
work in dangerous jobs in remote locations may subject such
employees to mandatory periodic medical examinations in the
interest of workplace safety. But, regardless of whether the agency
opts to change its policy, the courts should apply the remotelocation exception on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, the courts
should consider whether the employer's periodic medical
examination policy, which requires all remote-location employees
to submit to periodic medical examinations, serves a legitimate
business purpose of the employer, and is narrowly tailored to
effectuate that purpose. If so,
30 the courts should find that the policy
does not violate the ADA.1

foreseeable emergencies, though quite feasible, would be inordinately
expensive").
128. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85, 122 S.Ct.
2045, 2052 (2002) (OSHA's general duty clause requires employers covered by
OSHA to maintain a safe workplace for all employees); Fletcher v. Union Pac.
R.R., 621 F.2d 902, 909 (8th Cir. 1980) (Jones Act employer has a duty to assign
workers to jobs for which they are reasonably suited); Bailey v. Central
Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1063-64 (1943) (Jones
Act employer has a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work).
129. See, e.g., Chevron, 536 U.S. at 86, 122 S.Ct. at 2053 n.6 (opining that it
is "a business necessity for skyscraper contractors to have steelworkers without
vertigo").
130. My intent is that practitioners, scholars, and judges will be persuaded by
this article. When these remote-location or dangerous-job cases arise, I want the
judiciary to rule that the employer's mandatory periodic medical examination
policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity. But regardless of
whether the courts adopt my view, the courts will face several related issues: (i)
should a non-disabled employee have a claim against the employer for merely
requiring the employee to submit to the periodic medical evaluation in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)?; (ii) should a disabled employee have such a
claim if the employee suffers no cognizable injury from the required
examination? Consider the following example:
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An employer implements a periodic medical examination policy, which
requires all current remote-location employees to submit to a periodic medical
examination. A remote-location employee sues the employer after he submits to
the medical examination merely for requiring the medical examination in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). The employee is not disabled and has
experienced no adverse employment action as a result of the examination.
Notwithstanding whether the examination is job-related and consistent with
business necessity, can the non-disabled employee challenge the medical
examination in the first place? The weight of authority says yes, but not all
courts agree. Compare Conroy v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Svcs., 333
F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A] plaintiff need not prove that he or she has a
disability . . . in order to challenge a medical . . . examination under . . .
(d)(4)(A)."); Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir.
1999) (asserting that a plaintiff need not be disabled to assert a (d)(3)-(4) claim
for unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information); Fredenburg v.
Contra Costa County Dep't of Human Svcs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.
1999) ("[P]laintiffs need not prove that they are qualified individuals with a
disability in order to bring claims challenging the scope of medical examinations
under the ADA."); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124
F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997) (asserting that plaintiffs ability to prove a
claim under (d)(4) did not require her to prove she was an individual with a
disability); with Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 516-17 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting that the text of the ADA is unclear "whether non-disabled
individuals are permitted to sue for violations of § 12112(d)" and declining to
reach the question); Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 559 (5th
Cir. 1998) (declining to reach the question of whether the ADA provides a
private right of action for non-disabled job applicants who are subjected to preemployment medical examinations and inquiries in violation of §
12112(d)(2)(A), but finding that applicant's claim failed because he did not
allege any compensable injury and lacked standing to seek injunctive or
declaratory relief); O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1010 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2002) (non-disabled applicant cannot recover under § 12112(d)(3)(C)). See
also EEOC, Questions and Answers, supra note 19, at B ("This statutory
language makes clear that the ADA's restrictions on inquiries and examinations
apply to all employees, not just those with disabilities."). The courts that permit
non-disabled applicants and employees to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)
generally do so for two reasons: (i) the statutory language in § 12112(d)(2) and
(d)(4) refers to "job applicants" and "employees," not merely qualified
individuals with disabilities; and (ii) the belief that "[i]t makes little sense to
require an employee to demonstrate that he has a disability to prevent his
employer from inquiring as to whether or not he has a disability." See Conroy,
333 F.3d at 95; Roe, 124 F.3d at 1229. Some commentators have criticized this
position, at least with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) claims. See Allyson R.
Behm, The Americans with (or without) Disabilities Act: Pre-employment
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D. Taking Adverse Employment Action

The mere act of conducting a medical examination of a remotelocation employee should not violate the ADA. But how can the
employer use the employee's medical examination results without
running afoul of the ADA? The employer should only take
adverse employment action against an employee as a last resort. If
the medical examination reveals a health issue, the employer is
best served by placing the employee on a leave of absence so that
the employee can address the issue. If the employee receives
successful treatment, the employer should return the employee to
his or her original position upon presentation of a medical release.
In certain cases, however, that may not be possible. If, after
treatment, the employee's medical condition prevents him or her
from safely performing the essential functions of their job duties,
the employer may choose to take adverse employment action
against the employee.' 31

What types of procedures or assessments should the employer
make before taking adverse employment action? The employer
the
has a few options at its disposal. In EEOC v. Exxon Co.,
Fifth Circuit considered Exxon's policy of permanently removing
employees who had "undergone treatment for substance abuse
from certain safety sensitive, little supervised positions."' 133 Exxon
enacted the across-the-board policy in response to the 1989 Exxon

Medical Inquiries and the Non-disabled, 26 Am. J.L. & Med. 439, 449-52
(2000) (arguing that the statutory language, EEOC regulations, and legislative
history counsel against allowing non-disabled individuals to pursue §
12112(d)(2)(A) claims). In any event, I subscribe to the view that the mere fact
that the employee had to submit to a medical examination does not give rise to a
legally cognizable injury. See Armstrong, 141 F.3d at 559-62. Thus,
irrespective of whether the employee in my example is disabled or non-disabled,
he would not be entitled to legal relief. Id. I leave open the possibility that
injunctive relief could be appropriate, assuming the court finds--against my
wishes--that the medical examination is not job-related and consistent with
business necessity. Id. at 562-64.
131. Unless the FMLA applies, the employer does not have a statutory duty
to provide the employee with a leave of absence and to recertify the person for
duty. But, from a pragmatic perspective, such an approach shows the good faith
of the employer in case of subsequent suits. More importantly, this approach
should be taken because the employer should desire to treat its employees fairly
and be a good corporate citizen.
132. 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 872.
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Valdez incident, in which an Exxon tanker ran aground. 134 The
incident caused extensive environment damage and resulted in
"billions of dollars of liability for Exxon."' 35 The investigation of
the incident indicated that the tanker's chief officer's alcoholism36
which had been treated in the past, contributed to the accident.'
Exxon defended its policy as a safety-based qualification standard
that was job-related and consistent with business necessity. 137 The
EEOC argued that the direct-threat test must be used in all cases 1in
38
which an employer adopts a safety-based qualification standard.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the EEOC's argument, stating:
We have found nothing in the statutory language,
legislative history or case law that persuades that the direct
threat provision addresses safety-based qualification
standards in cases where an employer has developed a
standard applicable to all employees of a given class. We
hold that an employer need not proceed under the direct
threat provision of § 12113(b) in such cases but rather may
defend the standard as a business necessity. The direct
threat test applies in cases in which an employer responds
to an individual employee's supposed risk that
is not
39
addressed by an existing qualification standard. 1
The circuit based its holding on the language of § 12113(a) and

§ 12113(b), 140 the legislative history of the ADA, and the fact that
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b) & (c) (2005):
With regard to safety requirements that screen out or tend to screen out
an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities,
an employer must demonstrate that the requirement, as applied to the
individual, satisfies the "direct threat" standard in § 1630.2(r) in order
to show that the requirement is job-related and consistent with business
necessity.
139.

Exxon, 203 F.3d at 875.

140. Id. at 873 (Section 12113(a) suggests "a general standard applicable to
all employees. In contrast, the direct threat provision of section 12113(b),
phrased in the permissive, allows a requirement that the individual not pose a
threat to health or safety. The different approaches suggest that business
necessity applies to across-the-board rules, while direct threat addresses a

standard imposed on a particular individual."). 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) states:
In General.-It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under
this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests,
or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise
deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown
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"the business necessity defense under Title VII and the ADEA"
applies to "safety-based qualification standards which tend to
screen out women or certain age groups." 14 1 In short, under Exxon,
when an employer develops a general safety requirement for a
position, safety is a qualification standard that can be defended
under the ADA's business necessity defense, just like any other
qualification standard. 142 The Fifth Circuit correctly recognized
that across-the-board safety standards can be defended on business
necessity grounds. 143 The EEOC's position conflicts with the plain
language of the statute and cannot be justified.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether
the Fifth Circuit's holding in Exxon is correct, but dicta in
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg indicates that across-the-board
safety-based qualification standards can be defended on business
Moreover, other circuits which have
necessity grounds. 144
addressed the issue have
45 rejected the EEOC's position and sided
with the Fifth Circuit. 1
Relying on Exxon, the remote-location employer could take
adverse action against a remote-location employee if the
employee's medical examination results demonstrate that the
employee does not meet an across-the-board safety standard
established by the employer, so long as the safety standard is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. In evaluating
whether its safety standard constitutes a business necessity, the

to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such
performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as
required under this subchapter.

"Qualification Standards.-The term
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) provides:
'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."
141. Exxon, 203 F.3d at 873-75.
142. Id. at 874.
143. Id. at 875.
144. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569-70, 119 S. Ct.
2162, 2170-71 n.15 (1999) (questioning the soundness of the EEOC's position
requiring a showing of "direct threat" to justify a safety-based qualification
standard).
145. See Verzeni v. Potter, 109 Fed. Appx. 485, 490-91 (3d Cir. 2004)
(unpublished opinion) (holding that a defendant need not satisfy the direct threat
defense every time that a safety-based qualification standard has an adverse
impact on a disabled employee); Morton v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 272 F.3d
1249, 1258 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the EEOC's interpretation of the
statutory direct threat defense).
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employer should consider the nature of the risk and the connection
between its qualification standard and alleviation of the risk. In
this regard, the employer should assess the magnitude of possible
harm as well as the probability of the occurrence. The employer
should also think long and hard about why across-the-board, rather
than individualized, determinations are needed. The employer
should realize that these are the types of factors the courts will
consider should a disabled employee who suffers an adverse
employment action challenge the across-the-board safety
standard. 14 6 Finally, the employer should argue for aa lenient
f
interpretation of the business necessity defense. I
A prudent remote-location employer should take adverse
employment action against the employee only after conducting an
individual assessment of whether the employee's medical
condition prevents him from safely serving in the remote-location
The individualized assessment should take into
workplace.
account the examining physician's evaluation of the employee's
health condition, but the employer should realize it will not be able
to hide behind the medical judgments of the examining physician if
the physician's conclusions are not objectively reasonable. 48 The
individualized assessment should also involve a direct threat
analysis, which is similar to the business necessity analysis the
146. See Morton, 272 F.3d at 1263 ("[Iln assessing the validity of safety
standards under the ADA business necessity defense.., the nature of the risk,
the adequacy of the connection . . . between the employer's qualification
standard and alleviation of the risk, and the showing of the necessity of acrossthe-board rather than individualized determinations" are all relevant); Exxon,
203 F.3d at 875 ("In evaluating whether the risks addressed by a safety-based
qualification standard constitute a business necessity, [a] court should take into
account the magnitude of possible harm as well as the probability of
occurrence.").
147. See discussion supra Part HI.A.
148. See, e.g., Verzeni, 109 Fed. Appx. at 491-92 (business necessity defense
must be based on objective, up-to-date medical knowledge, not unfounded fears;
an employer's good faith actions will not save it if it is misinformed about the
realities of the individual's medical condition; in considering a business
necessity defense, "the jury should assess the objective reasonableness of the
views of health care professionals without deferring to their individual
judgments"). The employer should provide the examining physician with
information concerning the essential job functions and the conditions under
which the employee performs the job. In this way, the physician can better
assess the employee's fitness-for-duty based on his or her evaluation of the
employee's health condition. See Request for Technical Assistance, supra note
3, at 5.
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employer should undertake. 149 If the employer determines that the
employee's health condition poses a direct threat to himself or
others in the workplace, the employer may take adverse
employment action without violating the ADA.
IV. PATERNALISM AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

I advocate allowing employers to require periodic mandatory
medical examinations of remote-location employees on both moral
and economic efficiency grounds. The remainder of the article
elaborates on my position.
A. Reasoned Paternalismin the Name ofSafety is Not a Vice
The approach I have outlined recognizes that the ADA should
be interpreted to allow employers to require periodic medical
examinations of employees in certain dangerous jobs and to take
adverse employment action against employees when the
examinations reveal medical conditions that place those employees
and others at risk. I disagree with those commentators who would
decry that my approach violates the ADA because it is
paternalistic. Reasoned paternalism in the name of workplace
safety is not a vice.
I begin with the general notion that in many cases a periodic
medical examination of a remote-location or dangerous-job
employee-to the extent that an examination can diagnose an
employee's problematic medical condition-will reveal a medical
condition that places both the worker and others at substantial risk.
Return to my example of the driller who works on the offshore oil
rig. The periodic medical examination reveals that the driller has a
149. "'Direct threat' means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health
or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12111(3) (1995); Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78, 122 S.
Ct. 2045, 2049 (2002). The determination that an individual poses a "direct
threat" shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's
present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. "This
assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the
most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective
evidence." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). "In determining whether an individual would
pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) [tlhe duration of
the risk; (2) [tjhe nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [tlhe likelihood
that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential
harm." Id.
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cardiac condition that requires immediate surgery. The offshore
employer prohibits the driller from returning to his job in the Gulf
of Mexico until the condition is corrected. If the condition cannot
be entirely cured, the employer prohibits the driller from working
at his job in the Gulf. The effect of the offshore employer's
mandatory periodic medical examination policy and its
employment decision is to prevent the scenario that I revealed in
the introduction from taking place. The lives of both the worker
and his co-workers are saved. The periodic medical examination
and the employment decision are not paternalistic because they
protect the co-workers as well as the worker.
But one can imagine situations in which a periodic medical
examination is required of a remote-location or dangerous-job
employee and the examination reveals the employee has a medical
condition that places only that employee at risk, but the employer
nonetheless makes the decision to prohibit the employee from
working at that job. Consider a guide worker in the context of my
earlier example of a remote observatory in Hawaii. The periodic
medical examination reveals a respiratory condition that places the
worker at increased risk if she continues to work at such high
altitudes. The possibility exists that, while working at high
altitudes, she may have a respiratory attack and die before medical
attention can be provided. The Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal makes clear that the employer
may refuse to allow the guide worker to continue in150her position,
despite any concerns that such an act is paternalistic.
By now, the Echazabaldecision is well-known. In Echazabal,
the Supreme Court considered whether Chevron could refuse to
hire an applicant for a position in Chevron's oil refinery on the sole
ground that a post-offer medical examination revealed that the
applicant had a liver condition that would be aqravated by
continued exposure to toxins at Chevron's refinery.
Chevron
argued that it could deny the applicant employment, based on the
EEOC regulation that recognizes a threat-to-self defense. 152 The
applicant, Mr. Echazabal, argued that the EEOC regulation
exceeded the scope of permissible rule-making under the ADA
because the ADA statute makes clear that a threat to the individual
himself is not a permissible reason for precluding employment
under the ADA. 15 The Supreme Court concluded that, because
Congress had not directly spoken on threats to a worker's own
150. 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
151. Id. at 76, 122 S. Ct. at 2047.
152. Id. at 79, 122 S. Ct. at 2049. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2005).
153. Echazabal,536 U.S. at 79-80, 122 S. Ct. at 2049.
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health, the EEOC's regulation was permissible as it was a
reasonable one. 154 The Court pointed out that an employer who
hired an applicant knowing full well that the applicant's medical
condition placed him in danger would be asking for trouble from
155
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
OSHA requires an employer to provide a safe workplace for each
and every employee.
The Echazabaldecision is unique in that it bucks the trend of
disability cases in which the Supreme Court refused to defer to the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA. 157 But the departure should
not necessarily be read to mean the Court will be more inclined to
accept the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous ADA terms-like
business necessity-in future cases.
The decision is best
understood as consistent with the view that courts should adopt
constructions of ambiguous ADA terms that reflect good old58 and provide some degree of discretion
fashioned common
59 sense'
1
to the employer.
However, the Echazabal decision has not been popular with
some in the academic community. It has been criticized on
statutory interpretation grounds. 16( Further criticism has come
154. Id. at 84, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
155. Id. at 84-85, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
156. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
157. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194,
122 S. Ct. 681, 689 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 47980, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999); Eichhorn, supra note 73, at 202 (arguing that
while the Court has not yet decided the amount of deference due EEOC
regulations, the Sutton and Toyota decisions indicate a refusal on the Court's
part to defer to the EEOC position).
158. See Charles Lane, Supreme Court Limits Disabilities Act on Safety
Issue, Wash. Post, June 11, 2002, at A07 (Ann Elizabeth Reesman, general
counsel of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, hails the decision as a
"victory for common sense"); David Yee, CurrentEvent: Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Echazabal, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 213, 221 (2002).
159. See Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Writing the Law of Work on Nero's Pillars:
The 1998-99 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 Lab. Law. 181, 197, 203
(1999) (Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's decisions (ADA Supreme Court
decisions) are better explained by the default interpretive rule that when
Congress passes ambiguous texts courts are "bound to adopt the construction
least intrusive and least restrictive of the employer's discretion," as opposed to
the Court's claims of interpreting plain text).
160. See Tricia M. Patterson, PaternalisticDiscrimination: The Chevron
Deference Misplaced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 23 J. Nat'l Ass'n
Admin. L. Judges 147, 166 (2003) (arguing that application of the Chevron two-
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16 1
from those who view the decision as improperly paternalistic.
D. Aaron Lacy chides the Supreme Court for failing to
acknowledge the anti-paternalistic purpose of the ADA. 162 Mr.
Lacy draws upon works by classic liberalist scholars such as John
Stewart Mill and modem liberalist scholars such as Professors
Margaret Radin, Joel Feinberg, and Ronald Dworkin to argue that
the prevention of physical harm to an employee himself is not an
appropriate reason for invading the liberty of the employee by
restricting his right to alienate his labor. 63 The idea is that such a
restriction impermissibly invades the employee's personal
autonomy to have absolute power over the decision whether to risk
his or her health. 164 He argues that the employee knows better than
the employer whether the risks of the job are acceptable for him or
her and the employee has the sole right to make that choice,
regardless of whether that choice is viewed, from an objective
standard, as unwise. 165
The paternalism criticisms evoked by the Echazabal
commentators are unwarranted for several reasons. First, as the
Court notes, the sort of paternalism outlawed by the ADA is the
type based on myth and stereotype. 166 Reasoned paternalism based
on objective medical evidence and real risks is not prohibited by

step was misplaced because the statute did not show a lack of clear
Congressional intent or silence on the issue); Tara Jones, The Threat-to-Self
Defense and The Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 27 S. I11. U. L.J. 539, 561
(2003) (contending that the expression-exclusion canon was misused by the
Court).
161. See D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother's Keeper: Disabilities,
Paternalism,and Threats to Self, 44 Santa Clara L. Rev. 55, 90 (2003) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's decision in Echazabalfailed "to acknowledge the antipaternalistic purposes of the ADA"); Alexandra G. White, Note, Paralyzing
Discord: Workplace Safety, Paternalism,and the Accommodation ofBiological
Variance in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 63 La. L. Rev. 509, 572-73
(2003) (equating sex-based paternalism with disability-based paternalism and
concluding that disability-based paternalism should receive the same scrutiny as
sex-based paternalism).
162. See Lacy, supra note 161, at 90.
163. Id. at 91-98.
164. Id. at 97.
165. Id. at 98.
166. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85-86, 122 S. Ct.
2045, 2052-53 & n.5 (2002).
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the ADA. 167 An employer does not have to shut its eyes to the
realities of the employee's condition and the demands of the job in
question.168 As Judge Trott exclaimed in his Ninth Circuit dissent,
it would belie credulity to conclude that Congress intended a
manufacturer to be legally obligated to allow an employee with
narcolepsy to operate a power saw or a construction company to be
legally required to allow a steelworker who169develops vertigo to
keep his job constructing high-rise buildings.
Second, there is no indication that Congress intended to apply a
liberalist conception of plenary personal autonomy to the employee
who faces objective medical risks. While certain scholars may
view such a theory as preferred, examples abound in which the law
imposes restrictions on an individual's personal autonomy, despite
the fact that the individual's choice would harm no one but himself
or herself. Laws that prohibit drug use, require drivers to wear seat
belts, and make suicide a crime are but a few of the many
examples. 170 Reasoned paternalism has its support in the law.
Third, in contravention of the espoused liberalist conception of
the employee's complete personal autonomy to put him or herself
in harm's way, it should be understood that the employer has a
moral stake in the decision as well. While I am not so naive to
167. See House Labor Report, supra note 20, at 73-74 (stating that with
regard to a post-offer medical examination, "if the examining physician found
that there was a high probability of substantial harm if the candidate performed
the particular functions of the job in question, the employer could reject the
candidate .... "). See, e.g., Jessica L. Johnson, Comment, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct of 1990: The Incredible Shrinking Legislation? A Closer Look
at Chevron v. Echazabal and the Expansion of the Direct Threat Defense, 32

Cap. U. L. Rev. 761, 801 (2004) (arguing that well-reasoned decisions based on
current medical knowledge "do not violate the ADA" and that "concerns about
paternalism are unfounded"); Nathan J. Barber, Note, "Upside Down and
Backwards": The ADA's DirectThreat Defense and the Meaning of a Qualified

IndividualAfter Echazabal v. Chevron, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 149, 176
(2002) (asserting that legislative history "requires paternalistic action in favor of
workplace safety").
168. See Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation and California Manufacturers
and Technology Association as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045
(2002) (No. 00-1406) (citing real-world examples to point out the absurdity of
precluding employers from ignoring the well-being of disabled individuals when
making employment decisions).
169. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Trott, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom., 536 U.S. 73, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
170. See Lacy, supra note 161, at text accompanying notes 278-80.
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believe that all employers will make decisions based on altruistic
concern for the employee's health and safety, there are
undoubtedly employers who will object to putting the employee in
harm's way on legitimate moral grounds. An employer's moral
objections are valid and must be taken into consideration. Many
employers may rightly believe that leading the calf to the
slaughterhouse is no different than personally driving the knife into
the calf. 7 '
When the risks to the employee are real and not based on myth
or stereotype, the ADA does not prohibit the employer from taking
the decision out of the employee's hands. There is no way to get
around the fact that certain jobs-remote-location jobs in
particular-are inherently dangerous. Remote-location employers
must be allowed the flexibility to ensure that they provide a safe
workplace for all employees. Periodic medical examinations of
remote-location employees are necessary tools in that endeavor.
The medical examinations themselves, as well as adverse
employment actions against employees who have medical
conditions that place the employee and others in the workplace at a
substantial risk of injury, reflect reasoned paternalism and do not
violate the ADA.
B. The Efficiency of PeriodicMedical Examinations
Moral concerns notwithstanding, a rule of law that permits
remote-location
employers to require periodic medical
examinations also makes sense from an economic perspective. In
a recent, groundbreaking article, Professor J.H. Verkerke develops
an economic efficiency arjument to justify the ADA's duty of
reasonable accommodation. 72 Many of the cogent arguments and
insights provided by Professor Verkerke are beyond the scope of
my article. Nonetheless, the article provides analyses and insights
that support my argument. Professor Verkerke opines that dignity
and personal-fulfillment goals, as a general matter, mobilized
societal concern for the disabled and inform our understanding of

171. See Scott Quillin, Comment, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal: The
Supreme Court's Common Sense Interpretation of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct's Direct Threat Defense, 29 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 641, 658-59
(2004) (arguing that requiring an employer to "knowingly put an employee in
harm's way, even with the employee's consent" puts employers "in the position
of assisting" suicide and is "morally irresponsible").
172. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 903, 907
(2003).
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the ADA's purpose. 173 But he points out that dignity and personalfulfillment concerns are an "incomplete defense of laws barring
disability discrimination." ' 174 Taken to the extreme, concern for
"human dignity and self-fulfillment provides no stopping point, no
indication of when it might be permissible to deny an employment
opportunity to someone with a disability, perhaps even because of
that person's disability."' 175 Verkerke thus looks for an economic
approach that would separate morally and politically legitimate
disability discrimination from morally and politically illegitimate
discrimination. 176
As part of the development of his economic approach,
Professor Verkerke rejects a "wooden" interpretation of the ADA
that would "require employers to accommodate employees
wherever they might choose to work."' 7 7 He explains that
allowing workers with disabilities to be unconstrained in their
1 78
choice of occupation ignores the beneficial effects of matching.
Labor market efficiency is critically dependent on matching both
disabled and non-disabled workers for jobs to which they are wellsuited. 179 "'Mismatching' can occur whenever employers have
inadequate information about the characteristics of current
employees."' 180 In the real world, of course, no legal or economic
system could obtain perfect matching. But a legal system should
strive to promote matching. 8 1 Medical examinations of applicants
and employees provide a means of accomplishing that objective.
However, medical examinations also pose the risk of providing
employers with information by which they can make prejudicial or
stereotypical decisions.182 The ADA seeks to balance the concern
about "scarring ' ' 183 with the truth that health information can
sometimes be relevant to an applicant or employee's job
qualification through the regulation of examinations at the pre173. Id. at 904-05.
174. Id. at 904.
175. Id. at 905.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 936.
178. Id. at 937.
179. Id. at 910.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 913.
182. Id. at 925.
183. Professor Verkerke uses the term "scarring" to refer to instances in
which employer uses unproductive labor market signals (an unfounded
stereotype about a disability) to deny a job to someone who could be
productively employed. ld. at 910-11, 921-23.
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offer, post-offer, and post-employment stages. 8 4 My article is
concerned with whether it is legal under the ADA for certain
employers to require current employees to submit to mandatory
periodic medical examinations and, if so, the extent to which
information from that examination can be used by the employer to
make an employment decision.
In permitting medical examinations of current employees that
are "job-related and consistent with business necessity," Congress
recognized that situations exist where an employer must have the
flexibility to require such examinations. The problem is that
Congress did not expand enough on when that standard will be
satisfied. An economic perspective can help fill in the gaps left by
Congress and should guide the courts in drawing those lines. As
Professor Verkerke explains, the social costs of mismatching vary
widely from the "trivial to [the] extremely severe. ' 85 Based on
that insight, he distinguishes between high-risk and normal-risk
occupations. 186 A mismatched employee can cause grave social
harm in high-risk jobs, whereas the mismatched employee cannot
do much social damage in a normal-risk job.187 He argues that
courts should be permissive about employer inquiries, such as
medical examinations, in high-risk occupations, and less so in
normal-risk jobs. 188 This excerpt summarizes his point:
My earlier analysis suggested that courts should-and
almost certainly do-give employers greater freedom to
make disability-related inquiries for high-risk occupations.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, efficiency may also
demand that courts apply informational restrictions more
strictly for comparatively low-risk occupations. In fact, we
might even want to prevent employers from learning about
hidden disabilities that affect a worker's productivity.
Unless the information will produce better matching, there
exists a significant risk of scarring. Individuals with
disabilities will end up unemployed or underemployed.
However, this argument for concealment applies only to
jobs that pose little risk of severe mismatching and in
which the consequences of diminished productivity are
comparatively slight. A normative prescription follows
from this analysis. Courts and regulators should apply
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 926.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 929.
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informational
restrictions
more
strenuously
for
comparatively low-risk occupations. Coupled with our
earlier analysis of high-risk jobs, the frame-work thus
supports comparatively restrictive rules for low-risk jobs
and relatively
permissive standards for high-risk
8
occupations. '
The law concerning periodic medical examinations of current
employees, to a certain degree, reflects Professor Verkerke's
insight. On the high-risk side, FAA regulations require airline
9
pilots to submit to mandatory periodic medical examinations.1 0
Similarly, EEOC enforcement guidance allows employers to
require employees who work in public safety jobs to submit to
mandatory periodic medical examinations. 191 On the low-risk side,
the ADA clearly prohibits an Albertson's grocery store from
requiring employees who work as store checkers to submit to
mandatory periodic medical examinations. The uncertainty in the
law is that various categories of high-risk jobs exist in which
employees are neither required by law to submit to mandatory
periodic medical examinations, nor, according to the EEOC, does
the law allow employers to mandate that those employees submit
to such examinations. This gap prevents certain employers from
taking prudent steps to maximize workplace safety for employees
in high-risk jobs, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of
catastrophic injury. From an economic efficiency perspective, the
social costs that are paid, when, for example, a driller has a
massive heart attack while operating a drawworks deep in the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico, outweighs the risk that a disabled
individual may be terminated from his or her job due to a periodic
medical examination and subsequent adverse employment action.
I urge the courts and the EEOC to interpret the ADA to allow
employers to require remote-location employees
to submit to
19 2
mandatory periodic medical examinations.
189. Id. at 928-29.
190. See discussion supra note 47.
191. See supranote 50.
192. My pragmatic argument that the stringency of the ADA's business
necessity defense as related to medical examinations of employees should
decrease for employers who employ workers in dangerous jobs, as opposed to
employers who employ workers in normal jobs, aligns with the approach to
similar issues under Title VII advocated by Professor Spiropoulos. See Andrew
C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate
Impact Cause of Action:

Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1479

(1996). Professor Spiropoulos argues that, under Title VII, a flexible standard of
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V. CONCLUSION

EEOC guidance prohibits employers from requiring an
employee to submit to a medical examination unless such
examination is required by law, objective evidence indicates the
individual employee cannot perform his or her job duties or poses
a direct threat, or the public safety exception applies. The EEOC's
restrictive interpretation of the ADA fails to acknowledge that
employers who employ people to work in dangerous jobs, such as
remote-location positions, have unique safety-related concerns.
For these employers, a substantial risk exists that some of their
employees may develop medical conditions that preclude them
from performing their jobs in a safe manner. Of these employees,
some know about their medical conditions but choose not to
inform their employers of the problem. Others do not know that
they have a medical condition that places them and their coworkers at risk. In either case, the employer is unlikely to know
that the employees have medical conditions that place the safety of
the employers' workplace in jeopardy because the employees do
not exhibit any outward signs of a problematic condition. To
protect the workplace safety of all their employees, these
employers need the flexibility to require mandatory periodic
medical examinations. The EEOC should change its policy to
comport with the legitimate safety concerns of these employers.
Courts should rule that remote-location employers who require
current employees to submit to mandatory periodic medical
examinations do not run afoul of the ADA because the
examinations are "job-related and consistent with businessnecessity."

business necessity should be applied to jobs that "at their core require the
possession of intangible qualities or the performance of complex tasks" or jobs
in which employees "are responsible for the health and safety of others," but that
most other jobs should require a strict standard. Id. at 1539-40.

